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I 
VoJ. 12, No. 1 Winter 1989 
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES: PART I 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of taw, Case Western Reserve University 
This is the first of two articles on the impeachment of 
witnesses. 
CREDIBiliTY 
Credibility involves a witness' worthiness of belief. In a 
bench trial the court determines credibility. See In re 
Disbarment of Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 125 N.E.2d 
328 (1955). In a jury trial, passing upon the credibility of a 
witness is a jury function. See State v. Williams, 23 Ohio 
St. 3d 16, 21,23 O.B.R. 13, 490 N.E.2d 906 (1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S.Ct 1385 (1987) ("It is well-established that 
the witnesses' credibility is for the trier of fact to judge."); 
Siate v. Waiker, 55 Ohio St. 2d 208, 2i3, 378 N.E.2d i049, 
(1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979) ("It is the function 
of the jury to resolve the facts of the case and determine the 
credibility of the witnesses before it."); State v. DeHass, 
10 Ohio St. 2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967) (syllabus, para. 
1) ("Credibility of the witnesses [is] primarily for the trier 
of the facts."); Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Insurance Co, 
132 Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E.2d 153 (1936) (syllabus, para. 1) 
("[C]redibility must be determined by the jury."); RC 
2945.11 ("[T]hejury is the exclusive judge of all questions 
of fact."); Ohio Jury Instructions § 5.30 and 405.20. 
In a jury trial the court may not instruct the jury to 
disregard the testimony of a witness who has been 
impeached. See Sharp v. State, 16Qhio St. 218 (1865); 
Smiley v. Dewey, 17 Ohio 156 (1848). Nor may the court 
instruct the jurors that if they find that a witness has testi-
fied falsely on one matter they must rejectall the testimo-
ny of thatwitness. See Mead v, McGraw; 19 Ohio St. 55 
(1869); Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St. 496 (1869). 
In determining the credibility of witnesses the jury may 
consider a multitude of factors, including 
the appearance of each witness upon the stand; his 
manner of testifying; the reasonableness of the 
testimony; the opportunity he had to see, hear and 
know the things concernin'g which he testified; his 
accuracy of me-mory; frankness or lack of it; intelli-
gence, interest and bias, if any; together with all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the testimony. 
Ohio Jury Instructions§ 5.30. · 
See also In re Estate of Soeder, 7 Ohio App. 2d 271, 310, 
220 N.E.2d 547 (Cuyahoga 1966) ("Credibility, intelli-
gence, freedom from bias or prejudice, opportunity to be 
informed, the disposition to tell the truth or otherwise, 
and the probability or improbability of the statements 
made, are all tests of testimonial value."); Whitcomb v. 
State, 14 Ohio 282, 284 (1846) ('This was a question for 
the jury, to say whether she was to be believed. They saw 
her manner of giving testimony, which is sometimes of 
great importance in determining the credibility of a 
witness."); Nicholson v. Malone, 84 Abs. 206, 168 N.E.2d 
155 (App. Cuyahoga 1960) (province of jury to observe 
the demeanor of witnesses). 
Types of impeachment 
Evidentiary issues concerning credibility most often 
arise in connection with impeachment, that is, attempts 
to diminish the credibility of a witness. Although numer-
ous factors may be considered in evaluating credibility, "five 
main lines of attack upon the credibility of a witness" have 
been recognized. McCormick, Evidence § 33, at 72 (3d 
ed. 1984). The five are: bias, sensory-mental defects, 
prior inconsistent statements, contradiction, and untruth-
ful character, which includes opinion, reputation, and 
prior conviction evidence. 
The Ohio Rules of Evidence contain a number of rules 
on impeachment: Rule 608 governs the impeachment 
use of character evidence, i.e., opinion, reputation, and 
specific instances of conduct; Rule 609 governs the 
impeachment use of prior convictions; Rule 610 regu-
lates the use of religious belief as a method of impeach-
ment; Rule 613 covers prior inconsistent statements of a 
witness. Although there are a number of provisions deal-
ing with impeachment, the Rules of Evidence do not treat 
the subject in a comprehensive fashion. For example, 
there is no rule on impeachment by bias. 
IMPEACHMENT OF OWN WITNESS 
Rule 607 permits a party to impeach his own witness-
es. The right to impeach one's own witness is not unlimit-
ed, however; the party calling a witness may not impeach 
by means ofa prior inconsistent statement unless there 
is a showing of surprise and affirmative damage. 
'ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
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Rule 607 abolishes the "voucher r:ule,~-'-.whichprohibit­
ed a party from impeaching his own witnesses. See State 
v. Adams, 62 Ohio St. 2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 
The voucher rule was "based on the theory that when a 
party produces a witness he vouches for his veracity; 
that he cannot hold him out as worthy of belief when his 
testimony is favorable and impeach his credibility when 
his testimony is adverse." State v. Duffy, 134 Ohio St. 16, 
21, 15 N.E.2d 535 (1938). Accord, Thompson v. Kerr, 39 
Abs. 113, 120, 51 N.E.2d 742 (App. Allen 1942). 
This rationale was never persuasive because "except 
in a few instances such as character witnesses or expert 
witnesses, the party has little or no choice ofwitnesses. 
The party calls only those who happen to have obsenied 
the particular facts in controversy." McCormick, Evidence 
§ 38, at 82 (3d ed. 1984). Moreover, the continued validity 
of the voucher rule as applied in criminal cases became 
suspect after Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 
S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In Chambers the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court held that the combined effect 
of Mississippi's voucher rule and hearsay.rule precluded 
the admission of critical and reliable defense evidence 
and thus violated due process. "The 'voucher' rule, as 
applied in this case, plainly interfered with Chambers' 
right to defend against the State's charges." /d. at 298. 
Prior inconsistent statements 
Unlike Federal Rule 607, the Ohio rule imposes a limi-
tation on the impeachment of a party's ()Wn witness by 
means of a prior inconsistent statement. In such a case, 
impeachment is permitted only upon a showing of 
surprise and affirmative damage. ThisJimitation_was 
intendedto preventthe circumvention of the hearsay 
rule. Except as provided in Rule 801(D)(1)(a), prior incon-
sistent statements constitute-hearsay-evidence,.,and thus 
are admissible only for the purpose of impeachment. 
Without the surprise and affirmative damage require-
ments, a party could call a witness for the sole purpose of 
disclosing the prior inconsistent statement (hearsay) to 
the jury. An instruction limiting the use of the statement to 
impeachment would likely be ineffe~!ive. See Staff Note 
("Otherwise, the party would be entitled to -cail a known 
adverse witness simply for the purpose of getting a prior 
inconsistent statement into evidence by way of impeach-
ment, thus doing indirectly what he could not have done 
directly."). See generally Note, Impeaching One's Own 
Witness with a Prior Inconsistent Statement: Ohio and 
Federal Rules 607 and Hearsay Considerations, 50 Cin. L. 
Rev. 100 (1981). 
The Ohio rule was taken verbatim from an article by 
Professor Michael Graham, Employing Inconsistent 
Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive 
Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments 
of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75 
Mich. L. Rev. 1565, 1617 (1977). This article provides 
guidance on how Rule 607 should be applied. In particu-
lar, Professor Graham notes: "The requirement of 
surprise may be inappropriate in criminal cases where 
impeachment is by the criminal defendant: it could 
impede the defendant's right to confront the witnesses, 
to present a defense, and to produce witnesses on his 
own behalf." /d. at 1617. See also Graham, The Relation-
ship Among Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A), 
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. and.403:.AReplyto Weinstein's Evidence, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 
573 (1977); Graham, Examination of a Party's Own 
Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Promise 
Unfulfilled, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 917 (1976). 
See a/so State v. Dacons, 5 Ohio App. 3d 112, 5 O.B.R. 
227,449 N.E.2d 507 (Franklin 1982)(Evid. R. 607 not 
violated where witness is called by the court and is 
impeached with a prior inconsistent statement); State v. 
Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St. 3d 19, 22, 514 N.E.2d 394 (1987). 
Affirmative damage 
The Staff Note provides the following explanation of 
tlle~affifmativerdamage requirement: "Requiring a show-
ing of affirmative damage is intended to eliminate an 'I 
don't remember' answer or a neutral answer by the 
witness as a basis for impeachment by a prior inconsis-
tent statement." One court has written: "The party's own 
witness must testify to facts that contradict, deny, or harm 
that party's·trial position before the calling party can use 
the witness' prior inconsistent statement to impeach." 
Statev.Stearns, 7 Ohio App. 3d 11, 15, 7 O.B.R. 12, 454 
N.E.2d 139 (Cuyahoga 1982). Accord, State v. Blair, 34 
Ohio App. 3d 6, 516 N.E.2d 240 (Cuyahoga 1986). 
The rationale for this requirement is as follows: "If the 
witness does not give affirmatively damaging testimony, 
the [party]sirnply does not need to attack his credibility." 
Graham, Examination of a Party's Own Witness Under the 
Federai Ruies of Evidence: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 Tex. 
L. Rev. 917,979 (1976). 
Surprise 
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, the Ohio 
cases permitted a party, who was "surprised" by the 
testimony of his own witness, to question the witness 
<3.l:>Qut _a J:Jriqr [!consistent statement in an effort to refresh 
the wififess'iecol/ection. See State v. Diehl, 67 Ohio St. 
2d 389, 423 N£.2d 1112 (1981}; State v. Reed, 65 Ohio 
St. 2d 117, 418 N.E.2d 1359 (1981); State v. Dick, 27 Ohio 
St. 2d 162, 271 N.E.2d 797 (1971); State v. Minneker, 27 
Ohio St. 2d 155, 271 N.E.2d 821 (1971); State v. Springer, 
165 Ohio St. 182, 134 N.E.2d 150 (1956); State v. Duffy, 
134 Ohio St. 16, 15 N.E.2d 535 (1938); Hurley v. State, 46 
Ohio St. 320, 21 N.E. 645 (1888}; State v. Johnson, 112 
App. 124, 165 N.E.2d 814 (Cuyahoga 1960); Prok v. 
Cl~velan(j;600hio Abs. 515,522, 102 N.E.2d 253, (App. 
Cuyahoga 1951). 
Although these cases limited the use of the prior state-
ment to refreshing recollection, they also recognized the 
incidental impeachment effect of the evidence. See State 
v. Duffy, 134 Ohio St. 16, 15 N.E.2d 535 (1938); Hurley v. 
State, 46 Ohio St. 320,21 N.E. 645 (1888). However, in 
the absence of surprise and affirmative damage, permit-
ting a party to "refresh" a witness' recollection by read-
ing a prior statement in the presence of the jury would 
defeat the policy underlying Rule 607. See also Douglas 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 
(1965) (reading witness' statement in presence of jury 
violated right of confrontation). 
In State v. Holmes, 30 Ohio St. 3d 20,30 O.B.R. 27,506 
N.E.2d 204 (1987), the Supreme Court wrote: "Surprise 
can be shown if the testimony is materially inconsistent 
with the prior written or oral statements and counsel did 
not have reason to believe that the witness would recant 
when called to testify." /d. at 23. The Court, however, 
went on to find that the prosecution knew several days 
before trial that the witness would deny making the state" 
ment. See also State v. Stearns, 7 Ohio App. 3d 11, 15, 7 
O.B.R. 12, 454 N.E.2d 139 (Cuyahoga 1982) ("In this 
case, the trial judge was justified in concluding that the 
prosecutor was surprised by testimony significantly vary-
ing from the witnesses' prior written statements."). 
BIAS, INTEREST, OR MOTIVE 
Neither the Ohio nor the Federal Rules of Evidence 
contain a rule governing impeachment by means of bias 
or interest. In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 
465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 {1984), the United States Supreme 
Court held that impeachment of a witness for bias was 
proper. According to the Court, "the lesson to be 
drawn ... is that it is permissible to impeach a witness by 
showing his bias under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
just as it was permissible to do so before their adoption." 
/d. at 51. The Court went on to state that "[p]roof of bias is 
almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact 
and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to 
assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy 
and truth of a witness' testimony." /d. at 52. 
Moreover, RC 2945.42 provides: "No person is 
disqualified as a witness in a criminal prosecution by 
reason of his interest in the prosecution as a party or 
otherwise ... Such interest ... may be shown for the 
purpose of affecting the credibility of such witness." See 
also State v. Ferguson, 5 Ohio St. 3d 160, 165, 5 O.B.R. 
380, 450 N.E.2d 265 (1983) ("It is beyond question that a 
witness' bias and prejudice by virtue of pecuniary 
interest in the outcome of the proceeding is a matter 
affecting credibility under Evid. A. 611(8)."); Calderon v. 
Sharkey, 70 Ohio St. 2d 218, 223-24, 436 N.E.2d 1008 
{1982) ("Evidence of bias and pecuniary interest is a 
legitimate subject of inquiry of all expert witnesses ... "); 
Keveney v. State, 109 Ohio St. 64, 65-66, 141 N.E. 845 
{1923) ("The interest of witnesses in the result of the case 
is always one of the biggest factors in weighing their 
evidence, in determining its credibility."). 
Moreover, curtailment of a criminal defendant's efforts 
to establish bias on the part of prosecution witnesses is 
unconstitutional. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 
S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974}, the defense attempted 
to show that a key prosecution witness was a juvenile 
probationer and therefore had a motive-retention of his 
probationary status-to testify in a way favorable to the 
prosecution. The trial court, based on a statute, excluded 
this evidence. The United States Supreme Court 
reversed, finding a violation of the defendant's right of 
confrontation: "The State's policy interest in protecting 
the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot 
require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the 
effective cross examination for bias of an adverse 
witness." /d. at 320. See also Delaware v. VanArsdall, 
475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); 
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 
956 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 
218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). 
Types of bias 
There are two broad categories of bias. First, a rei a-
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tionship between a witness and one of the parties is 
evidence of bias. The relationship may be a favorable 
one, such as familial, employment, business, or sexual 
relationship, or it may be a hostile relationship, caused by 
prior fights and quarrels. See Taylor v. Schlichter, 118 
Ohio St. 131, 136-37, 160 N.E. 610 (1928) (hatred and 
revenge); Gladman v. Carns, 9 Ohio App. 2c;l135, 137, 
223 N.E.2d 378 (1964) (wife's interest affects credibility). 
Second, a relationship between a witness and the liti-
gation also is evidence of bias. See State v. Ferguson, 5 
Ohio St. 3d 160, 165, 5 O.B.R. 380,450 N.E.2d 265 (1983) 
(interest in related civil case); Calderon v. Sharkey, 70 
Ohio St. 2d 218, 223, 436 N.E.2d 1008 (1982} (expert's 
interest in related cases); Powell v. Powell, 78 Ohio St. 
331,85 N.E. 541 (1908) (financial interest in case); Zink v. 
Contris, 116 App. 95, 186 N.E.2d 865 (Hancock 1961) 
(interest in related litigation). 
One of the most common examples of interest in the 
litigation arises in cases in which a prosecution witnes:? 
is offered immunity or a reduced charge in exchange for 
testifying against the defendant. Such arrangements, as 
well as the pendency of criminal charges, are always 
admissible to show bias. See State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St. 
2d 316, 348 N.E.2d 351 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932, 
97 S.Ct. 339, 50 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976}; State v. Hector, 19 
Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969); Allen v. State, 10 
Ohio St. 287 (1859). See also Keveney v. State, 109 Ohio 
St. 64, 141 N.E. 845 (1922); Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). In State v. 
Gavin, 51 Ohio App. 2d 49, 365 N.E.2d 1263 (Cuyahoga 
1977), the court commented: 
In a criminal case the spectre of bias materializes 
anytime the evidence indicates that the witness has 
potential trading assets to barter with the State. For 
instance, the potential is suggested whenever the 
witness is: (1) a co-defendant, an accomplice or a 
suspect susceptible to charge in the case on trial or (2) 
under pending indictment in another case or a suspect 
susceptible to charge in another case or (3) serving 
time subject to executive commutation, pardon or 
parole. /d. at 53. 
Foundational requirements; extrinsic evidence 
Most jurisdictions require as a prerequisite that a foun-
dation be laid for the introduction of extrinsic evidence of 
bias. Thus, the examiner must raise the question of bias 
during the examination of the witness or be foreclosed 
from presenting the testimony of other witnesses on the 
issue. McCormick, Evidence§ 40 (3d ed. 1984). Ohio, 
however, apparently follows the minority view; no founda-
tion is required. In State v. Kehn, 50 Ohio St. 2d 11, 361 
N.E.2d 1330 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 858, 98 S.Ct. 
180, 54 L.Ed.2d 130 (1977), the Court stated: "[l]mpeach-
ment of a witness by showing bias or prejudice does not 
require the foundation ne.cessary for impeaching a prior 
inconsistent statement." /d. at 19. Accord, State v. Carl-
son, 31 Ohio App. 3d 72, 31 O.B.R. 112, 508 N.E.2d 999 
(Cuyahoga 1986). 
In addition, bias is not considered a "collateral matter," 
and thus extrinsic evidence of bias is always admissible; 
the impeaching party is not limited to attempting to elicit 
the evidence during the examination of the witness. 
"[W]here the cross-examination is ... with the view of 
showing the feeling, bias or interest of the witness with 
respect to the parties or either of them, the p-a-rty cross~ 
examining may, in a proper case, call witnesses to 
contradict the testimony so elicited on cross-examin-
ation." Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884) (syllabus, 
para. 1). See also Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481,485, 
140 N.E. 364,365 (1922) ("Evidence relevant upon the 
question of credibility, especially of an interested 
witness, is in no sense collateral."). 
See generally 3A Wigmore, Evidence § § 943-69 
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence§ 607[03] (1987); 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal 
Evidence§ 341 (1979). 
SENSORY OR MENTAL DEFECT 
Any sensory or mental defect that might affect a 
witness' capacity to observe, recall, and relate the events 
about which the witness has testified is admissible to 
impeach that witness' credibility. Evidence that the 
witness was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at 
the time of the event or the time of trial falls within this 
category. See generally McCormick, Evidence § 45 (3d 
ed. 1984); 3A Wigmore, Evidence§§ 931-35,989-95 
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence 1607[04] (1987); 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal 
Evidence§ 342 (1979). No provision of the Rules of 
Evidence governs this type of impeachment. 
The Ohio cases on this subject include: State v. Auer-
bach, 108 Ohio St. 96, 98, 140 N.E. 507 (1923) (witness' 
"means of observation" subject to cross-examination); 
Morgan v. State, 48 Ohio St. 371, 373-74,27 N.E. 710 
(1891) (right to cross-examine witnesses on their opportu-
nity to observe); Village of Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio St. 
549;-552~53, 22N.E. 407 (1889) ("intelligence, fairness, 
opportunities to observe, and other circumstances affect-
ing the credibility of the witness, can be called-outbya 
cross-examination ... "); Lee v. State, 21 Ohio St. 151, 154 
(1871) (proper to test witness' recollection); Bell v. Rinner, 
16 Ohio St. 45, 48 (1864) (evidence that witness was 
"drunk, paralyzed, deaf" proper; but extrinsic evidence 
of lack of ordinary intelligence inadmissible); Stewart v. 
State, 19 Ohio 302, 304 (1850) (proper to cross-examine 
witness on opportunity to observe and remember); John-
son v. Knipp, 36 Ohio App. 2d 218,221, 304 N.E.2d 914 
(Summit 1973) (intoxication of witness at time of. event 
relevant to credibility); McAllister v. State, 13 Ohio Abs. 
360, 362 (App. Madison 1932) (mental condition of 
witness affects credibility); State v. Webb, 72 Abs .306, 
308, 131 N.E.2d 273 (C.P. Butler 1955) (mental condition 
of witness affects credibility). 
These cases do not indicate whether extrinsic evidence 
of sensory or mental defects may be introduced. There is 
probably no hard and fast rule. Sensory and mental 
defects often can be effectively disclosed through cross-
examination, in which case the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence would be regulated by the trial court pursuant 
to Rules 403 and 611(A). 
SPECIFIC CONTRADICTION 
There are two distinct methods of impeachment by 
contradiction. First, self-contradiction involves the use of 
a witness' own prior inconsistent statements to contradict 
his present testimony. Second, contradiction may involve 
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the testimony of one witness that conflicts with the 
testimony ofanother witness. For example, witness A 
may testify that he saw the defendant shoot the victim, 
but witness B, who was also present, may testify that he 
saw a different person shoot the victim. It is this latter 
type of contradiction that is discussed in this section. 
Under what circumstances a party may introduce 
extrinsic evidence of contradiction is unclear. No provi-
sion of the Rules of Evidence governs this issue. Contra-
diction on so-called "collateral matters" is prohibited. "It 
is elementary that a witness may not be impeached by 
evidence that merely contradicts his testimony on a mat-
ter:Jhatis_coiJate,ra,L~'~By:omin v. Alvis, 169 Ohio St. 395, 
396, 159 N.E.Zcf§97 (19$9). See also State v. Cochrane, 
151 Ohio St.J28, 135, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949) ("The cross-
examiner is not permitted to introduce rebuttal evidence 
to contradict the witness on collateral matters."); State v. 
Hickman, 77 App. 479,486-87, 67 N.E.2d 815 (Montgomery 
1945). The policy underlying this rule is stated in State v. 
Kehn, 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 17, 361 N.E.2d 1330 (1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U$. 85e, 98 S.Ct. 180, 54 L. Ed.2d 130 (1977): 
"[T]he court, by exCluding the testimony, avoided the 
dangers of.suq)rise,jury confusion and wasted time 
which are the reasons for the rule against impeachment 
on collateral matters." 
The prqblemillapplying this rule is determining what 
constitutes a "collateral matter." The same issue is 
presented when a prior inconsistent statement is offered to 
impeach. Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent state-
ments is not admissible on "collateral matters." Wigmore 
argued that extrinsic evidence of contradiction should be 
admitted if the evidence would be admissible "for any 
purpose independently of the contradiction." 3A 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1003, at 961 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
McCormick describes this test as follows: 
The classical,approach is that facts which would have 
been independently provable regardless of the contra-
diction are not "collateral." ... 
Two general kinds of facts meet the test. The first 
kind are facts that are relevant to the substantive 
issues in the case ... 
The second kind of facts meeting the above mentioned 
test for facts that are not collateral includes facts which 
would be indepemdently provable by extrinsic evidence, 
apart from the contradiction, to impeach or disqualify 
the witness. Among these are facts showing bias, 
interest, conviction of crime, and want of capacity or 
opportunity for knowledge. 
McCormick, Evidence§ 47, at 110-11 (3d ed. 1984). 
This approach was followed in Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 
426 (1884), inwhich the Court held that extrinsic evidence 
was admissible when "the matter offered in contradiction 
is in any way relevant to the issue, or such as tends to 
show prejudice or interest ." /d. at 431. 
McCormick also argued that extrinsic evidence of con-
tradiction should be admitted in situations in which such 
evidence is critical to determining the credibility of a wit-
ness' story. He refers to this as "linchpin" evidence. 
McCormick, Evidence§ 47, at 112 (3d ed. 1984). This 
suggests that the trial court should have discretion on 
this matter pursuant to Rule 403. See 3 Weinstein & 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 1607[05] (1987). Several 
Ohio cases seem to support this view. See Mimms v. 
State, 16 Ohio St. 221, 233 (1865); State v. Patterson, 43 
Ohio App. 2d 63, 69-71, 332 N.E.2d 770 (Hamilton 1974). 
See generally 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 
343 (1979). 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
Ohio has followed the traditional practice of admitting 
prior inconsistent statements only for impeachment. 
Under this approach, the prior statement is offered to 
show the inconsistency between the witness' ti"ial and 
pretrial statements, rather than to show the truth of the 
assertions contained in the pretrial statement. If offered 
for the latter purpose, the statement is hearsay. See G. 
M. McKelvey Co v. General Casualty Co, 166 Ohio St. 
401, 405, 142 N.E.2d 854 (1957); State v. Duffy, 134 Ohio 
St. 16, 24, 15 N.E.2d 535 (1938); State v. Wright, 11 Ohio 
App. 2d 31, 33,227 N.E.2d 650 (Cuyahoga 1967); 
Columbus v. Freeze, 100 App. 37, 135 N.E.2d 419 
(Franklin 1955); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co v. McCune, 
46 App. 291, 294-95, 188 N.E. 568 (Franklin 1933). 
In general, the Rules of Evidence maintain this distinc-
tion. There are, however, a number of exceptions. For 
example, under Rule 801(D)(1)(a), prior inconsistent 
statements taken under oath, subjeQtto cross-examin-
ation at the time made, and subjecfto penalty of perjury 
may be admitted as substantive evidence. Moreover, 
prior inconsistent statements that qualify as admissions 
of a party-opponent under Ru!e 801(0)(2) are a!so admis-
sible as substantive evidence. 
Foundational requirements 
Rule 613(A) provides that a prior written statement 
need not be shown to a witness as a prerequisite to an 
examination on that statement. Thus, tlie rule abolishes 
the requirement imposed by Queen Caroline's Case, 2 
Brad. & Bing. 284, 129 Eng; Rep. 976 (1820), and accord-
ing to the Staff Note, "represents a departure from prior 
Ohio law." See Stern and Grosh, A Visit With Queen 
Caroline: Her Trial and Its Rule, 6 Capital L. Rev. 165 
(1976). The rule does provide, however, that the opposing 
counsel has a right to inspect the statement upon request. 
"The provision for disclosure to counsel is designed to 
protect against unwarranted insinuations that a state-
ment has been made when the fact is to the contrary." 
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. A. 613. See also 
Bluestein v. Thompson, 102 App. 157, 139 N.E.2d 668 
(Hamilton 1957); Walton v. Elftman, 64 Ohio Misc. 45, 410 
N.E.2d 1282 (C.P. Cuyahoga 1980). 
Rule 613(8) requires that a witness be afforded an 
opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent state-
ment before extrinsic evidence of that statement is 
admissible. The rule follows prior Ohio Jaw. In King v. 
Wicks, 20 Ohio 87 (1851), the Supreme Court held: 
"Before a witness can be contradicted by proving state-
ments out of court at variance with his testimony, he must 
be first inquired of, upon cross-examination, as to such 
statements, and the time, place, and person involved in 
the supposed contradiction." /d. (syllabus). Accord, State 
v. Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211,217-18, 364 N.E.2d 216 
(1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911,98 S.Ct. 
3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1978); Radke v. State, 107 Ohio St. 
399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923); Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St 426, 
429 (1884); Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1, 10 (1864}; 
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Kunkel v. Cincinnati Street Railway Co, 82 App. 341, 80 
N.E.2d 442 (Hamilton 1948); Saunders v. Wiggins, 48 
App. 174, 192 N.E. 745 (Stark, 1934). 
No foundation is required if the trial court finds that the 
"interests of justice" would be defeated by imposition of 
the foundational requirements. The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to Federal Rule 613 provides the following 
explanation of this provision: "In order to allow for such 
eventualities as the witness becoming unavailable by the 
time the statement is discovered, a measure of discretion 
is conferred upon the judge." Thus, Ohio cases holding 
that a foundation is mandatory in all situations are no 
longer controlling. See Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1 
(1864) (syllabus, para. 2); French Brothers-Bauer Co v. R 
& G Motor Car Co, 19 Ohio App. 299 (Hamilton 1923); 
Baird v. Detrick, 8 Ohio App. 198 (Clark 1917). 
Rule 613(B) differs from the federal rule. The addition 
of the word "prior" before the phrase "opportunity to 
explain or deny" conforms the Ohio rule to the traditional 
practice. This formulation of the rule is based on 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 613(b). In contrast, Federal 
Rule 613(b) does not require that the witness be afforded 
an opportunity to explain or deny before extrinsic 
evidence is introduced, so long as the witness is afforded 
such an opportunity at some time during the trial. The 
purposes of requiring an opportunity to explain or deny 
prior to the admission of extrinsic evidence are: "(1) to 
avoid unfair surprise to the adversary, (2) to save time, as an 
admission by the witness may make the extrinsic proof 
unnecessary, and (3) to give the witness in fairness a 
chance to explain the discrepancy." McCormick, 
Evidence§ 37, at 79 (3d ed. 1984). 
Inconsistency requirement 
To be admissible, a prior statement must be inconsis-
tent with the witness' trial testimony. The Ohio cases 
have adopted a liberal view of the inconsistency require-
ment. State v. Kline, 11 OhioApp. 3d 208,212,11 O.B.R. 
330, 464 N.E.2d 159 (Huron 1983) ("In Ohio, the rule is a 
liberal one with respect to establishing inconsistency."). If 
the prior statement can be interpreted in either of two ways, 
only one of which is inconsistent with the trial testimony, 
the statement is admissible: "[If the prior statement] is 
susceptible of different meanings, one of which would be 
inconsistent with the truth of such testimony, it is admis-
sible in evidence, leaving the jury to determine which is 
the true meaning." Dilcher v. State, 39 Ohio St. 130 
(1883) (syllabus, para. 4). See also McCormick, Evidence 
§ 34 (3d ed. 1984). 
If the witness' testimony includes material facts that 
were omitted in the prior statement, the statement is 
inconsistent. See State v. Kline, 11 OhioApp. 3d 208,212, 11 
O.B.R. 330, 464 N.E.2d 159 (Huron 1983); 3A Wigmore, 
Evidence § 1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). If the witness 
claims a lack of memory or lack of knowledge at trial, the 
prior statement may be inconsistent. See State v. 
Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211,218, 364 N.E.2d 216 (1977), 
vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3137, 57 
L.Ed.2d 1157 (1978); Blackford v. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St. 
268, 270, 20 N.E.2d 522 (1939) (exclusion of prior state-
ment when witness testified "I don't know," "I don't re-
member," or "I don't believe so" is erroneous). In State v. 
Doherty, 56 Ohio App. 2d 112, 381 N.E.2d 960 (Hamilton 
1978), the court commented: 
We would not say that every statement by a witness 
that he cannot recall an event is inconsistent with a 
statement in regard to the event made at a previous 
time. However, where as here, the events occurred only 
ninety days before and were of a type and under 
circumstances which an individual would remember 
quite vividly, we are of the opinion that the trial judge 
did not abuse his discretion in determining that [the 
witness'] assertion of lack of memory was untrue and, 
in effect, was a repudiation of his prior statements. /d. 
at 114. 
Statements in opinion form 
The Ohio cases have followed the minority view and 
excluded prior inconsistent statements in opinion form. In 
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 
158 (1929), the Supreme Court held: ''A witness who 
testifies as to facts cannot be discredited by evidence of 
the expression of an opinion relative to the merits of the 
case." /d. (syllabus, para. 3). Accord, Miller v. Lint, 62 
Ohio St. 2d 209, 404 N.E.2d 752 (1980); Cottom v. Klein, 
123 Ohio St. 440, 175 N.E. 689 (1931); Dorsten v. 
Lawrence, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253 N.E.2d 804 (Lucas 
1969). See a/so Comment, The Use of Prior Inconsistent 
Statements of Opinion to Impeach: Ohio's Position, 13 
Akron L. Rev. 86 (1979). 
The rule orecludina the use of Prior statements in opin-
ion form is difficult to Justify. For example, in Miller v. Lint, 
62 Ohio St. 2d 209, 404 N.E.2d 752 (1980), the only 
eyewitness to an accident testified on behalf of the plain-
tiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that it was error 
to permit the impeachment of the witness with a prior 
staterrnrntto the effect that the defendant could not have 
avoided the accident. This statement was made to a 
police officer at the scene of the accident:·=Fhe statement 
was obviously inconsistent with the witness' trial testimo-
ny and cast doubt on that testimony. As McCormick has 
commented: 
[T]he principal practical value of the opinion rule is as a 
regulation of trial practice requiring the examining 
counsel to bring out his facts by more-specific ques-
tions if practicable, before resorting to more general 
ones. For this reason, it is a mistake of policy to apply it 
to any out-of-court statements whatsoever, ,since no 
such controls are possible. Moreover, when the out-of-
court statement is not offered at all as evidence of the 
fact asserted, but only to show the asserter's incon-
sistency, the whole purpose of the opinion rule, to im-
prove the objectivity and hence reliability of testimonial 
assertions, is quite inapplicable. McCormick, Evidence 
76 (3d ed. 1984). 
See a/so 3A Wigmore, Evidence§ 1041 (Chadbourn rev. 
1970). 
It is uncertain whether the prior Ohio cases survive the 
adoption of the Rules of Evidence. Rule 701 governs the 
admissibility of lay opinion testimony. That provision 
adopts the modern view, which treats the opinion rule as 
a rule of preference. This view is inconsistent with the 
application of the rule to extrajudicial statements. More-
over, Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate fact prohibition, 
upon which Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 
80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929), and Cottom v. Klein, 123 Ohio St. 
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440~ 175 N.E. 689 (1931), were based. 
Extrinsic evidence 
If the witness admits making the prior statement, it is 
not error for the trial court to refuse to admit the state-
ment in evidence. See Blackford v. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St. 
268,270, 20 N.E.2d 522 (1939); Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio 
St. 177, 165 N.E. 721 (1929); State v. Johnson, 10 Ohio 
App. 3d 14, 17, 10 O.B.R. 20, 460 N.E.2d 625 (Franklin 
1983); Dietsch v. Mayberry, 70 App. 527, 47 N.E.2d 404 
(Williams 1942). A court's decision to admit the state-
ment, however, is also probably not error. See Bluestein 
v.~Thompson,":tQ2App .. 157, 139 N.E.2d 668 (Hamilton 
1957). In Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253 
N.E.2d 804 (Lucas 1969), the court held that "after a 
proper foundation for impeachment has been laid for the 
introduction of inconsistent statements of a witness, it 
becomes necessary to prove them." /d. at 305. 
Collateral matters 
Even if a proper foundation has been laid on cross-
examination, extrinsic evidence of a prior statement is 
admissible only if it does not relate to a "collateral 
matter." Byomin v. Alvis, 169 Ohio St. 395, 159 N.E.2d 
897 (1959); Kent v. State, 42 Ohio.St. 426 (1884). The 
collateral matter rule applies only to extrinsic evidence; it 
does not preclude inquiry on cross-examination so long 
as the examination is relevant to impeachment. 
As noted earlier in this article, the exact definition of 
what constitutes a collateral matter in Ohio is not clear. 
See also State v. Riggins, 35 Ohio App. 3d 1, 3, 519 
N.E.2d 397 (Cuyahoga 1986) (admissibility of evidence 
on collateral matters is a matter within the discretion of 
the trial court); Schwartz v. Wells, 5 Ohio App. 3d 1, 3, 5 
O.B.R. 1, 449 N.E.2d 9 (Warren 1982); McCormick, 
Evidencec§B6·(3ded, 1984); 3A Wigmore, Evidence§ 
1020 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); 3 Weinstein & Berger, Wein-
stein's Evidence ,607[06] (1987). 
Prior inconsistent conduct 
Rule 613 does not govern impeachment by evidence of 
prior inconsistent conduct. See Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. Evid. R. 613 ("Under principles of expression 
unius the rule does not apply to impeachment by 
evidenpe of prior inponsistent conduct."). 
Ohio cases, however, have recognized impeachment 
by prior inconsistent conduct. In Dilcher v. State, 39 Ohio 
St. 130 {1883), the Supreme Court commented: 
"Conduct inconsistent with the testimony of a witness, 
may be shown as well as former statements thus incon-
sistent." /d. at 136. Accord, Westinghouse Electric Corp 
v. Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture Corp, 42 Ohio St. 
2d 122, 132; 326 N.E.2d 651 (1975) ("inconsistency in 
behavior" admissible for impeachment). The Supreme 
Court in Westinghouse Electric Corp imposed the same 
foundational requirements for impeachment by prior 
inconsistent conduct as are required for impeachment by 
prior inconsistent statements. 
Constitutional issues 
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held 
that statements obtained in violation of the Miranda 
requirements could be used for impeachment. See also 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L. Ed.2d 
570 (1975). Involuntary confessions, however, cannot be 
used for impeachment. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed.2d 290 (1978). Similarly, the 
Court has permitted the impeachment use of evidence 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, at least 
under some circumstances. United States v. Havens, 446 
U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); Walder v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 
(1954). 
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 
L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held 
that the impeachment use of a defendant's silence after 
receiving Miranda warnings violated due process. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[W]hile it is true that the Miranda 
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will 
carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person 
who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it 
would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due 
process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used 
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." 
/d. at 618. 
In subsequent cases, the Court has clarified the limits 
of the Doyle decision. In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 
231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), the Court held 
that a defendant's pre-arrest silence is admissible for 
impeachment purposes. According to the Court, "no 
governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent 
before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the 
petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda 
warnings. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness 
present in Doyle is not present in this case." /d. at 240. 
Doyle, which governs post-Miranda silence, and 
Jenkins, which governs pre-arrest silence, left one issue 
undecided. Miranda requires warnings only if there is 
"custodial interrogation." An arrest satisfies the custody 
requirement, but if there is no interrogation, warnings are 
not required. Consequently, a suspect could be arrested, 
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remain silent, and never receive warnings. In Fletcher v. 
Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), 
the Court considered whether such silence could be 
used to impeach a defendant. The Court held that pre-
Miranda silence could be used to impeach: "In the 
absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied 
in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates 
due process of law for a State to permit cross-examina-
tion as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses 
to take the stand." /d. at 607. 
The Doyle decision also does not apply if the defen-
dant decides to make a statement after receiving Miran-
da warnings: "Doyle does not apply to cross-examination 
that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements. 
Such questioning makes no unfair use of silence, 
because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiv-
ing Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain 
silent. As to the subject matter of his statements, the 
defendant has not remained silent at all." Anderson v. 
Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 
222 (1980). 
The Supreme Court considered a different Doyle issue 
in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S.Ct. 634, 
88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). In that case the prosecutor used 
the defendant's post-Miranda warnings silence as 
substantive evidence of the defendant's sanity. The 
Court found that Doyle controlled and reversed. The 
Court commented: 
The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally 
unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence 
will not be used against him and thereafter to breach 
that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial 
testimony. It is equally unfair to breach that promise by 
using silence to overcome a defendant's plea of insani-
ty. /d. at 292. 
A defendant may not be impeached by a prior state-
ment given pursuant to a grant of immunity. See New 
Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 
L.Ed.2d 501 (1979). 
